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The Simulation Theories of Dreaming: 
How to Make Theoretical Progress in 
Dream Science
A Reply to Martin Dresler
Antti Revonsuo, Jarno Tuominen & Katja Valli
Among the most pressing challenges for dream science is the difficulty of estab-
lishing theoretical unification between the various theories, ideas, and findings
that have been presented in the literature to answer the question of how it is pos-
sible to construct a solid scientific theory with predictive and explanatory power
in dream science. We suggest that the concept of “world-simulation” serves as the
core concept for a theoretically unified paradigm to describe and explain dream-
ing. From this general concept, more specific theories of the function of dreaming
can be derived, such as the Threat Simulation Theory (TST) and the Social Simu-
lation Theory (SST), as we argued in our target article. We agree with Dresler
that these two functions may not be the only functions of dreaming, but we still
have grounds to believe that they are the strongest contenders. In our reply we
first clarify why the functions of sleep should be considered separately from the
functions of dreaming. Second, we outline what a good scientific theory of dream-
ing should be like and what it should be capable of. Furthermore, we evaluate the
current state of simulation theories within this context. To conclude, we propose
that instead of a general multifunctional theory of sleep and dreaming, where no
hypothesis is excluded, the future progress of dream science will benefit more from
opposing, competing and mutually exclusive theories about the specific functions
of dreaming. This, however, demands that the opposing theories and their predic-
tions must be risky, clearly formulated, and empirically testable. 
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1 Introduction 
We are grateful to  Martin Dresler (this collec-
tion) for his thorough and insightful comment-
ary on our target article (Revonsuo et al. this
collection).  Dresler‘s  commentary  places  the
proposed simulation functions of dreaming into
the wider context  of  other functions for sleep
and  dreaming,  demonstrating  that  these  phe-
nomena may have multiple different and partly
overlapping  functions.  He  also  suggests  the
threat  simulation  and  social  simulation  func-
tions are unique. They can neatly be connected
to  evolutionary  theory  and  only  they  explain
why the suppression of reality testing and the
lack of lucidity are necessary features of these
simulation functions of dreaming (i.e., they re-
quire  an  “oblivious  avatar”).  While  we  agree
with many of the points presented in Dresler‘s
analysis, we believe that it is possible to regard
the different proposed functions of dreaming as
representing  different  (preliminary)  scientific
theories  of  dreaming.  When  viewed  from this
theory-driven perspective, it is also possible to
present more definitive evaluations as to which
of them are more plausible theoretical explana-
tions than others.
2 Function of sleep vs. function of 
dreaming
Many of  the  findings  Dresler (this collection)
mentions  in  his  commentary  are  not  about
dreaming, but rather about sleep, its different
stages,  and  their  potential  correlates,  effects,
and  functions.  While  it  is  encouraging  that
there is much evidence about the functions of
sleep that relates to memory and learning, and
that  emotionally  significant  information  seems
to hold a special  place,  most of those studies
have very little or nothing to do with dreaming
as a subjective experience. In most of the sleep
studies, whether or not the sleeping participants
have  been  dreaming  or  not,  and  what  their
dream contents have been, is irrelevant for the
hypotheses being tested (e.g., whether a certain
stage of sleep enhances memory consolidation of
particular types of stimuli) and usually remains
unknown.  In  sleep  studies  purely  objective
neurophysiological and behavioural phenomena
are  investigated  with  objective  measures.  In
contrast,  in  dream  studies  purely  subjective
phenomena are explored by collecting subjective
introspective reports describing the contents of
phenomenal  consciousness.  Modern  theories  of
the  functions  of  sleep  are  undoubtedly  quite
strong as scientific theories of sleep and its rela-
tionship to some neurocognitive mechanisms of
memory and learning, but they are not in any
direct sense theories of dreaming. Of course, any
proposed theory of dreaming should be at the
very least consistent with the leading theories of
sleep, because the phenomenal level of organiza-
tion supervenes on the lower, neurophysiological
level.  However,  the opposite is  not necessarily
true.  As  Dresler (this collection)  points  out,
lower-level  functions  can  be  carried  out  inde-
pendently of the higher, phenomenal level of or-
ganization. Thus, we would like to strongly em-
phasize that the merits and the predictions of
theories of dreaming primarily have to be tested
by  using  data  that  reflects  subjective  dream
contents, not the objective features of sleep.
3 What is it like to be a strong scientific 
theory of dreaming? 
Any theory of a phenomenon should include a
precise definition and description of  its target
phenomenon (or explanandum), as well as clear
demarcation of conceptually and empirically dif-
ferent phenomena. Theories of dreaming should
clearly state i) in what way dreaming is a differ-
ent type of phenomenon from sleep (or any par-
ticular  stage  of  sleep),  and  ii)  in  what  way
dreaming is a special form of mental activity oc-
curring during sleep. In our approach the start-
ing points are that while sleep and its different
stages can be defined by objective behavioural
and  neurophysiological  criteria,  dreaming  is  a
subjective  phenomenon;  a  special,  complex
altered state of consciousness that can be differ-
entiated from simple sleep mentation. Quite in-
dependently from any functional considerations,
the general, universal form of dreaming, as most
dream researchers currently agree, is a complex,
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multi-modal  simulation of  the sensory percep-
tual world, inhabited by a simulated self  or a
self-model (Hobson 2009; Metzinger 2003, 2013;
Nielsen 2010;  Windt 2010).  A fruitful  idea in
biology is that form suggests function; thus the
form that dreaming takes,  a world-simulation,
most likely suggests that the major functions of
dreaming have something to do with world-sim-
ulation. The most frequent dream contents are
therefore the most likely candidates for reflect-
ing the  specific  function(s)  of  dreaming:  how,
when, under what circumstances, and what con-
tents to simulate. Thus, to state that dreaming
is an internal world-simulation is to describe the
general form that this phenomenon universally
takes,  but  not  necessarily  its  function.  The
function(s) of the simulation, according to our
view, are mainly related to the specific contents
selected for simulation.1 
Furthermore, a proper theory of dreaming
should be simple yet covering, so that the same
general  principles  apply  to  many  types  of
dreams, including the pathologies of dreaming,
animal  dreaming,  and other special  cases;  the
theory should be fruitful, so that it leads to new
ideas, hypotheses, and new directions for active
research;  it  should  be  empirically  testable,  so
that it leads to risky predictions whose accuracy
can be objectively checked. It should have both
predictive and explanatory power. 
Of  course,  these  virtues  are  desirable  in
any scientific theory of any phenomenon. When
there  are  rival  theories  of  the  same  phe-
nomenon, they should be compared with regard
to their overall strengths and weaknesses as sci-
entific theories. If they are consistent with each
other,  perhaps  they  can  be  combined  into  a
single, more covering theory. If they are incon-
sistent  with each other,  their  differing predic-
tions should be empirically tested. After their
relative strengths and weaknesses are compared,
it  should  be  possible  to  say  which  ones  are
stronger than others.
1 Further,  Dresler (this collection) raises the question of whether the
frequency of specific dream contents can be regarded as evidence for
the importance of its underlying functions. If we consider the func-
tion of dreaming more broadly to be that of a training ground for es-
sential and adaptive behaviors, it becomes rather clear that the ob-
served frequency of these behaviors can be viewed as a valid measure
of their importance. This, however, is evident only when comparing
the contents within the phenomenal level of explanation.
4 Simulation theories of dreaming
According to the simulation view, dreaming is a
special case of phenomenal consciousness, or the
phenomenal  level  of  organization  being  activ-
ated  in  the  brain.  Waking  consciousness  and
dreaming are manifestations of the same natural
biological  phenomenon in  the  brain,  but  they
occur in different contexts and under different
conditions. The simulation theory of dreaming
is  anchored to a more  general  theory of  con-
sciousness, which in turn is anchored philosoph-
ically to weak emergent materialism and multi-
level  explanation  (Bechtel 2008,  2011;  Craver
2007; Revonsuo 2006, 2010). In a multi-level ex-
planation of a mental phenomenon, several dif-
ferent explanatory dimensions surround the tar-
get phenomenon: the downward-looking explana-
tion specifies its neural correlates and mechan-
isms;  the  backward-looking mechanisms specify
what has causally brought about or modulated
the phenomenon (e.g., day residues or traumatic
experiences that directly influenced specific con-
tents of dreaming; the ontogeny of dreaming—
how dreaming came about during individual de-
velopment;  phylogeny—how dreaming emerged
and might have been selected for during evolu-
tionary history2); and the upward-looking (func-
tional)  explanation—how does dreaming guide
or change consequent mental states or external
behaviours? Only after all these explanatory di-
mensions can be accounted for may we be said
to have a comprehensive theory of dreaming, in-
cluding its function(s) (see also Revonsuo 2006,
2010; Valli 2011). 
So  far,  one  general  and  three  separate,
more specific simulation theories have been pro-
posed. From a more general perspective, some
versions of the Continuity Hypothesis (CH) can
be regarded as a simulation theory, as some pro-
ponents of it consider the world-simulation itself
to  be  a  functional  form of  dreaming  (e.g.,
Foulkes 1985, pp. 201–202). Three other, more
specific simulation theories have been proposed:
2 We should,  however,  also keep in mind the option that dreaming
does not serve any function at all and was not selected for, but is
merely  epiphenomenal,  as  suggested,  for  example,  by  Flanagan
(2001), and implied by the Continuity Hypothesis (CH). This notion
should be the null hypothesis against which the proposed functions
of dreaming are to be pitted.
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the  protoconsciousness  theory  (Hobson 2009),
which covers the role of dreaming in ontogeny;
the  Threat-Simulation  Theory  (TST),  which
covers  the  negative  contents  of  dreaming and
provides an evolutionary account for them; and
the Social Simulation Theory (SST), which cov-
ers  the  social  contents  of  dreaming,  including
the  positively  charged  ones.  Taken  together,
these theories are at the same time both cover-
ing and economical: the simple principle of “in-
ternally  activated  world-simulation”  underlies
all of them (see figure 1). The proto-conscious-
ness theory accounts for how and why the basic
form  of  the  virtual-reality  generator  comes
about in the developing brain, and how during
early brain maturation both dreaming and wak-
ing  consciousness  emerge  together  in  interac-
tion. It is, however, the most speculative of the
three simulation theories, as we cannot hope to
test it  with data about subjective experiences
describing  the  postulated  fetal  dream  experi-
ence:  what  is  it  like  to  be  a  proto-conscious
dreaming  fetus?  Thus,  its  weakness  is  that
dream reports or any other direct evidence of
the  existence  of  subjective  dream-like  states
cannot  conceivably be empirically collected to
test the validity of the theory. 
The TST and SST, as we have explicated
in our target article (Revonsuo et al. this collec-
tion)  and  in  earlier  publications  elsewhere
(Revonsuo 2000,  2006;  Valli & Revonsuo 2009)
are  testable  as  they  issue  specific  predictions
concerning the frequency and quality of dream
contents  under  different  circumstances.  They
are also covering, TST potentially accounts for
normal dreaming as well as several special types
of dreams, where negative dream contents are
particularly  abundant  and  dominate  (bad
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Figure 1: Simulation theories of dreaming. All simulation theories assume that dreaming can be defined as a world-
simulation, the form of which is functional. The protoconsciousness-theory is more focused on explaining the form of
dreams instead of their specific contents. Threat simulation and Social simulation theories try to explain the content of
dreams as having a specific function, while the Continuity Hypothesis assumes the content of the simulation to be evol-
utionarily non-functional.
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dreams,  recurrent  dreams,  nightmares,  post-
traumatic  dreams,  children’s  earliest  dreams,
dreams in parasomnias such as RBD, night ter-
rors, and so on). Together TST and SST poten-
tially cover a very large proportion of the stat-
istically most frequent dream contents, and the
predictions  derived  from  these  theories  have
specific empirically testable consequences as to
the quantity and quality of these types of dream
contents. As Dresler (this collection) points out,
simulation theories also have the advantage of
being highly consistent with the peculiar beha-
vioural,  neurophysiological,  and  phenomenal
features  of  dreaming  such  as  isolation  from
sensory input,  motor activity,  cognitive reflec-
tion, and reality testing. These features are ne-
cessary preconditions for running powerful, phe-
nomenologically  realistic  but  behaviorally  isol-
ated virtual reality simulations in the sleeping
brain. The simulation theories thus have a lot of
explanatory power. The concept of world-simu-
lation unifies numerous separate phenomena re-
lated to dreaming and makes sense of them un-
der a single concept. In this the simulation the-
ories of dreaming fulfil the requirements of sim-
plicity, coverage, and economy as well as having
predictive and explanatory power. Compared to
some of the other ideas Dresler presents in his
commentary, it appears that currently the simu-
lation theories are amongst the strongest frame-
works for the form and function of dreaming.
5 Rival paradigms in dream science
Of the theories that are directly applicable to
dreaming, we have already addressed the Con-
tinuity  Hypothesis  (CH)  in  our  target  article
(Revonsuo et  al. this collection).  As  we  say
there, it has never been formulated in a suffi-
ciently precise manner such that risky, testable
predictions  can  be  derived  from it.  The  CH,
largely because of its vagueness, might actually
be consistent with simulation theories. The par-
ticular contents of dreams are neither selected
through an active process, nor do they reflect
any  function(s);  they  are  selected  through  a
passive and more or less random mirroring of
the experiences that have been lived through.
Further, CH does not consider how to deal with
potential  anomalies  for  the  theory:  the  relat-
ively frequent cases where either something very
alien to our waking world (and thus entirely dis-
continuous with it) appears, or where something
very common in our waking life fails to appear
in our dream contents. Can the theory be re-
garded  as  falsified  when  evidence  of  such
blatantly discontinuous dream contents appear
over and over again in dream data? One version
of the CH, presented by  Foulkes (1985) states
that the mnemonic sources of  dream contents
are random and unpredictable; thus dream con-
tents  are  unselective  random  samples  of  our
memories;  but  the general  form of  dreams as
world simulations as such is highly predictable
—thus the function of dreaming would be more
related to the general form than to the specific
contents  of  dreams.  However,  as  we  have  ar-
gued, dream contents are  not random, but se-
lective, and in particular they select threatening
and social events into dreams. Thus, the basic
assumption behind Foulkes‘s version of CH has
turned out to be empirically false. The CH thus
does not look very promising. But, as we argued
in our target article (Revonsuo et al. this collec-
tion), some testable predictions can and should
be derived from CH, to render its predictions as
the null hypothesis “no selectivity, no function-
ality”, and thereby directly test its predictions
against those derived from TST and SST.
Another major functional theory of dream-
ing, the Emotion Regulation Theory (ERT; also
reviewed by Dresler this collection), also seems
relatively  weak  as  a  scientific  theory.  It  has
been  presented  by  many  different  authors  in
many different formulations (e.g., Cartwright et
al. 2006; Hartmann 1996; Kramer 1991). There
seems  to  be  no  standard,  detailed,  or  shared
version  of  this  theory  among  its  supporters;
thus it also suffers from a vagueness similar to
that of CH. The shared core in all of the differ-
ent versions appears to be the idea that dream-
ing works with and processes difficult, unpleas-
ant  emotions  and  events,  and  through  this
dream processing makes us get over them and
feel and function better in our lives. An often-
used analogy compares dreaming with psycho-
therapy  (Hartmann 1995;  Walker &  van  der
Helm 2009). 
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Again, when looking at the evidence it is
important  to  separate  sleep  from  dreaming.
When it comes to emotional processing during
sleep, the analogy to psychotherapy gains some
support  (Walker &  van  der  Helm 2009).  But
when  applied  specifically  to  dreaming  and
dream contents, the idea runs into difficulties.
Its  theoretical  roots  appear  to  originate  pre-
dominantly  from  the  clinical  tradition,  and
more specifically from the idea that the function
of  dreaming  is  to  protect  sleep  from  strong
surges of emotion and to solve emotional prob-
lems. The negative contents of dreams originate
from  interpersonal  conflicts  and  current  con-
cerns, thus being consistent with the continuity
between dreaming and waking, in fact so much
so  that  the  CH coupled  with  the  ERT could
perhaps be seen to form one specific paradigm
of dream theorizing. Perhaps one of the core dif-
ferences  between the ERT+CH paradigm and
the simulation paradigm is their relationship to
biological  explanations.  The ERT+CH favours
psychological-level explanations and emphasizes
recent individual experiences (learning, nurture)
as  proximate  explanations  of  dreaming.  The
simulation  paradigm emphasizes  biological  ex-
planations of the form and contents of dream-
ing, and links dream consciousness to both the
underlying neurophysiological  levels  as  well  as
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic, ultimate bio-
logical  history of  dreaming as explanations of
the form and contents of dreaming. A further
core difference between these paradigms is that
the psychological paradigm sees the function of
dreaming as  contributing  to  our psychological
well-being and psychological adaptation to our
lives, whereas the biological paradigm sees the
origin of dreaming in its ability to increase fit-
ness in all mammals and in humans during their
evolutionary history; but dreaming need not ne-
cessarily contribute  to  our  psychological  well-
being  in  order  to  fulfill  its  original  biological
function.
As  these  approaches  represent  different
paradigms  with  differing  core  ideas,  it  might
not be possible to integrate them, in the man-
ner that  Dresler (this collection) suggests, into
one overall multifunctional theory of dreaming.
Some of the core assumptions of ERT are incon-
sistent with TST, especially when it comes to
the function(s) of dreaming and to the explana-
tion of nightmares and bad dreams. According
to  TST,  post-traumatic  dreams,  recurrent
dreams, nightmares, bad dreams, and the earli-
est  dreams  in  childhood  are  the  best  and
strongest  manifestations  of  the  function  of
dreaming,  when the  function  is  fully  at  work
and  typically  activated  by  ecologically  valid
threat  cues and dangerous events  observed in
the  environment,  often  displaying  universal
threat scripts consistent with evolutionarily rel-
evant threats. In parasomnias the threat-simula-
tion system can be overactivated, or activated
in an inappropriate context and therefore seen
as  psychologically  dysfunctional,  so  that  it
might in actuality either decrease the well-being
of  the  individual  or  hamper  with  other  func-
tions of sleep and dreaming, even though it at
the same time carries out its original biological
function  perfectly.  By  contrast,  according  to
ERT, such highly negative dreams are malfunc-
tions and failures of the core function of dream-
ing  itself,  because  such  dreams  disturb  sleep
and make us feel negative emotions. Nightmares
cause psychological suffering and sleep disturb-
ances, thus they are like a failed psychotherapy
session that increases the individual’s psycholo-
gical distress, instead of calming the individual
down. As such, very large and important cat-
egories of dreams (and their functionality) are
explained in squarely opposing ways by the two
paradigms.
6 Concluding remarks
Consequently, it is not only possible but theor-
etically necessary to separate the basic assump-
tions, the predictions, and the hypotheses of the
simulation theories from those of ERT and oth-
ers.  We  can  have  multiple  theories of  dream
functions,  but  dreaming  as  a  specific  phe-
nomenon cannot have multiple conflicting func-
tions! If one theory says that recurrent dreams,
nightmares,  and  bad  dreams  are  types  of
dreams that most strongly carry out the TST
functions and thus were selected for in human
evolutionary  history,  and  another  theory  says
that such dreams are, from the functional point
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of view, total failures of dream function, it be-
comes impossible to construct from those mutu-
ally  opposing  ingredients  a  “multifunctional”
theory.3 A theory that combines TST and ERT
would have to say that  on the one hand the
function of dreaming is to have many threaten-
ing events in dreams, bad dreams, nightmares,
and recurrent negative dreams, in order to re-
hearse threat perception and avoidance, but on
the other hand the function of dreaming is also
to calm down or suppress exactly those types of
dreams to make the dreamer feel better. What
is the dream production system supposed to do:
increase or decrease the number and impact of
these kinds of dreams? The multifunctional the-
ory cannot derive coherent testable predictions
about the quantity and quality of these types of
dreams.
This situation, however, is far from a sci-
entific catastrophe; in fact, it is highly desirable.
The problem is not that there is a lack of differ-
ent  theories,  hypotheses,  ideas,  or  suggestions
about  the  nature  and  functions  of  dreaming,
but  rather  that  there  are  too  many.  Con-
sequently, it is not only possible, but theoretic-
ally  necessary  to  separate  the  basic  assump-
tions, predictions, and hypotheses of the simula-
tion theories from those of ERT, CH, and oth-
ers. We can have multiple independent theories
of dream functions, but dreaming as a specific
phenomenon cannot have multiple mutually in-
consistent functions. We hope that the simula-
tion  theories  of  dreaming,  whether  they  turn
out  to  be  correct  or  not,  will  at  least  push
dream science forward. The progress of any sci-
ence is best served by the directly opposing pre-
dictions issued by rival, clearly stated, empiric-
ally testable  hypotheses.  Thus it  is,  from the
scientific point of view, much more desirable to
3 The multifunctionality  of  dreaming might  be  possible  in  different
populations, so that in a population that lives in a very threat-filled
environment a strong threat simulation system would be selected for,
whereas in a population living in more peaceful conditions the psy-
chotherapeutic  function  and  taming  of  threat  simulations  dreams
would be more likely candidates for selection. However, one and the
same population cannot manifest both functions at the same time.
Just as in some species of moths, in one environment individuals are
selected for  towards  being  white  because  white  provides  the  best
camouflage, while in another environment the color of individuals in
the same moth species is  selected for towards being dark gray or
black, because in that environment all the white individuals are too
easily detected by predators.
have  many  squarely  opposing  testable  hypo-
theses than one all-inclusive theory that is un-
falsifiable or too vague to be tested. When the
opposing  theories  have  been  well-formulated
and put through fair but strict empirical tests
several times, we will know which ones to adopt
for the time being and which ones to leave be-
hind for good, in order to keep dream science a
progressive branch of science.
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